Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2021

From Liability Shields to Democratic Theory: What We Need from
Tort Theory Now
Heidi Li Feldman
Georgetown University Law Center, feldmanh@georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2422
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3985503

Journal of Tort Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, forthcoming.
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Torts Commons

14 Journal of Tort Law, Issue 2 (2021 forthcoming)

FROM LIABILITY SHIELDS TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
WHAT WE NEED FROM TORT THEORY NOW
Heidi Li Feldman*
1 Introduction
Among possible legal responses to a pandemic, quashing tort liability might
seem startling. Common sense indicates that a deadly and debilitating disease
would call for possible tort liability, to enable recovery for losses by those
subjected to the disease because of others’ carelessness while also
discouraging careless conduct that could lead to preventable cases illness in
the first place. Yet, when faced with SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, the lifethreatening disease caused by the virus, the first response of many American
lawmakers was to enact, or attempt to enact, COVID-19 “liability shield”1
statutes. These laws introduced doctrine to eliminate or narrow grounds for
tort claims against those who caused others to contract COVID-19.
As it turns out, the COVID-19 liability shields have an extensive pedigree
in the American law of torts. In this article, I review the steady introduction
of what I call “eliminative” tort doctrines, especially the wave of them dating
back to the 1970s. Individually and together, these doctrines sharply reduce
the grounds for personal injury claims, burden the injured’s ability to prevail
in permitted claims, and restrict the recovery available even when such claims
succeed. Eliminative tort doctrines appear in both federal and state law and
apply in a variety of factual circumstances. I maintain that existing
eliminative tort doctrines facilitated the rapid promulgation of intricate,
detailed COVID-19 liability shield statutes.
A fifty-year surge in eliminative doctrines is a distinctive development.
It calls for explanation and interpretation. In this article, I introduce a tort
theory that centers eliminative tort doctrines, rather than dismiss them as
*
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1
The legal response to COVID-19 popularized the term “liability shield”. Based on an
informal search of the Access World News data base of North American news sources,
2000 and 2019, the term appeared 907 times across the publications in the database;
whereas just from January 1, 2020 to September 1, 2021, it appeared 2910 times. The
phrases “liability shield” or “tort liability shield” seem to date back to business-led effort to
nationalize products liability law, discussed below in section 3, though in that context, their
connotation was somewhat negative. See Thomas Ferraro, Consumer Groups Claim
Victory, UPI(USA) (May 16, 1985), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.proxygtlaw.wrlc.org/apps/news/document-view?p=AWNB&docref=news/15690B0EC2F91FA8).
(“They argued the measure would give industry a product liability shield by imposing a
greater burden of proof on consumers and by making it more difficult for them to get
information from manufacturers.”)
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aberrations or passing political fads. I title the theory “tort deflationism.” It
is deflationary because it treats tort law as a field that should be modest in the
legal liability it creates and the extent of the liability it allows. I argue that
tort deflationism is latent in the post-1960s eliminative tort doctrines and their
relationship to modern American conservatism, a broad social, intellectual,
and political movement that arose after World War II and continues to the
present day.
I myself do not endorse tort deflationism. I have chosen to articulate it in
this article in order to explore its explanatory power, evaluative force,
implications for alternative tort theories, and potential significance for
democratic theory and practice. Tort deflationism deserves serious attention,
if for no other reason than to clarify grounds for objecting to it or to criticize
its conception of the law of personal injury.
In the next three sections, I examine the COVID-19 liability shields and
their predecessors so as to identify the features that any theory geared to them
must illuminate. In section 5, I spell out the mid-level principles central to
tort deflationism and develop a full-blown theoretical synthesis of these
principles by showing their ties to the intellectual and ethical commitments
of modern American conservatism. I complete the section by illustrating how
tort deflationism can make sense of developments in American tort law other
than the post-1960s surge in eliminative tort doctrines, using as an example
the law of workplace injury. In section 6, I discuss how tort deflationism
compares to other tort theories. I show that it can serve as a useful foil.
Finally, in the conclusion, I suggest that my consideration of tort
deflationism, its relationship to other tort theories, and its role in perpetuating
disagreements about tort doctrine speak to ongoing debates about the
legitimacy of law in pluralist democracies. I urge tort theorists to enter these
debates and to consider their implications for tort law itself.
2 COVID-19 and tort liability shields
In late 2019 and early 2020, a new coronavirus began to sweep the world,
one that, as of this writing, continues to devastate the United States. During
January 2020, six Americans died of COVID-19. By the end of March 2020,
7,157 Americans had died of the disease; by the end of June, COVID-19
deaths officially numbered 18,003. 2 Many more Americans had been
seriously ill but had survived. By mid-March 2020, almost every state had
declared a state of emergency.3 By early April, most states had issued “stay2
Daily Updates of Totals by Week and State: Provisional Death Counts for Coronavirus
Disease 2019, CDC (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm.
3
Rosie Perper ,Ellen Cranley & Sarah Al-Arshani, Almost All US States Have Declared
States of Emergency to Fight Coronavirus — Here’s What It Means for Them, INSIDER
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at-home” orders, closing schools, daycares, and nonessential businesses, 4
almost all states had limited the size of gatherings, and about half the states
had mandated masks.5
By May of 2020, the business community was championing “liability
shields,” which would insulate business owners and operators from almost
every possible kind of tort suit arising from exposure to SARS-CoV-2.6
Republicans in the United States Senate responded to this call. In July of
2020, Senate Republicans proposed the SAFE TO WORK Act (STWA), an
extensive set of interlocking liability-limiting provisions that would
explicitly preempt state tort law.7 States themselves also instituted COVID19 liability shields. By August 2020, roughly seven states had implemented
some such measure.8 By June 2021, thirty states had adopted shields largely
tracking STWA’s provisions.9 In at least four states, Democratic governors
signed STWA-like bills into law.10
Had STWA itself been enacted, it would have erected broad, thick,
nationwide barriers to personal injury claims. According to the text of the
bill, the need to federalize personal injury claims arising from COVID-19
came from the “unpredictability” created by a “patchwork of local and State
rules governing liability in coronavirus-related lawsuits.”11 Whether such a
(Mar. 17, 2021, 10:34 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/california-washington-stateof-emergency-coronavirus-what-it-means-2020-3.
4
States that Issued Lockdown and Stay-at-Home Orders in Response to the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTOPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/States_that_issued_lockdown_and_stay-athome_orders_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021).
5
State-Level Mask Requirements in Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic,
2020-2021, BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Statelevel_mask_requirements_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID19)_pandemic,_2020-2021 (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
6
Jim Tankersley & Charlie Savage, Business Seek Sweeping Shield From Pandemic
Liability Before They Reopen, N.Y. TIMES, (June 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/businesses-coronavirus-liability.html;
David Morgan, Businesses Seek Legal Protection for When Coronavirus Lockdowns Lift,
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2020, 3:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirususa-liability/corporate-america-seeks-legal-protection-for-when-coronavirus-lockdownslift-idUSKCN223179; Jeff Stein & Josh Dawsey, White House Face Internal Debate Over
Liability Shield for Firms Seeking Protection from Coronavirus Lawsuits, WASH. POST
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/24/liability-shieldwhite-house-coronavirus/.
7
Safe to Work Act, S. 4317, 116th Cong. (2020).
8
Elaine S. Povich, Businesses Want a Shield Against COVID-19 Lawsuits. But What About
Customer Safety?, PEW RSCH. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/08/11/businesses-want-a-shield-against-covid-19-lawsuitsbut-what-about-customer-safety.
9
Chris Marr, Covid-19 Shield Laws Proliferate Even as Liability Suits Do Not,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 8, 2021, 2:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/covid-19-shield-laws-proliferate-even-as-liability-suits-do-not.
10
The four are Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, and North Carolina.
11
Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.
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jumble existed when STWA was proposed, now some large measure of
uniformity obtains, because state COVID-19 liability shields have content
very similar to one another and to STWA’s major provisions.
Many of the state laws open with broadly worded announcements that no
tort liability claims may arise from COVID-1912 or none may arise so long as
an alleged injurer has complied with or made a good faith effort to comply
with public health guidance.13 In a couple of states, the issue of compliance
is reserved to judges, to be decided as a matter of law. 14 So, compliance
becomes a basis for early dismissal of suits.
The statutes tend to make exceptions to their otherwise sweeping grants
of immunity for situations where an injurer has acted with some degree of
culpability beyond negligence, such as gross negligence, recklessness,
intention, wantonness, or actual malice. But the culpability exceptions are
kept trim: in some jurisdictions, compliance with public health guidance
creates a presumption against finding the requisite culpability; 15 in some
jurisdictions, a plaintiff must establish culpability according to a clear and
convincing standard rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, the
lower and usual burden of proof in noncriminal cases.16 A number of state
12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-515 to 12-516(A) (LexisNexis 2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-1201103 (West 2021); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-3403(1) (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3032-6 (West 2021); S.B. 5, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021); S.B. 65, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont.
2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99E-71 (West 2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-48-03 (West
2021); H.B. 606, 144th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2021); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-3-2 (2021); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-68-2 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. 29-34-802(b) (West 2020); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 148.003 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-517(2)
(West 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19-4 (West 2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.476(2)
(West 2021).
13
ALA. CODE § 6-5-792(a) to (b) (2021); H.B. 76, 32d Leg. (Alaska 2021); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.38(3)(c)2 (West 2021); IOWA CODE ANN. § 686D.5 (West 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-5504 (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.25 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
691.1455 (West 2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-71-5 (West 2020); Legis. B. 39(3), 107th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.835(1)(b)(1) (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 76,
§ 111(B) (2021). In Montana, compliance with public health guidance may be asserted as
an affirmative defense to any permitted claim arising from exposure to COVID-19. S.B. 65,
67th Leg. (Mont. 2021). In North Dakota, compliance creates a complete immunity,
regardless of the degree or kind of culpability on the alleged injurer’s part. Under STWA,
plaintiffs had to prove that a defendant was not making “reasonable efforts” to comply with
public health guidance. Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.P
14
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.38(3)(c) (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.83.
15
H.B. 76, 32d Leg. (Alaska 2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-515 to 12-516(A) (LexisNexis
2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-1105 (West 2021); GA. CODE ANN. 51-16-2(a) (West
2020); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-3403(2) (West 2020); S.B. 5, 2021 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-71-11 (West 2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 533.1005 1(1) (2021); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-48-02 (2021); H.B. 606, 144th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2021); S.C. CODE.
ANN. § 15-3-4 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. 29-34-802(b) (West 2020); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 148.003 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-517(2) (West
2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19-7 (West 2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.476(3) (West
2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-114(a) (West 2021). STWA permitted liability if plaintiff
proved gross negligence or willful misconduct. Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.
16
ALA. CODE § 6-5-793(b)(1) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-515 to 12-516(A) (LexisNexis
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laws further narrow possible tort recovery by explicitly adopting a
presumption of primary assumption of risk17 based on codified waivers and
warnings.18
Some states impose heightened pleading requirements on COVID-19
plaintiffs. Some laws require particularity in pleading a claim for liability
arising from COVID-19. 19 Some require a physician’s or other scientific
expert’s affidavit in support of the plaintiff’s initial complaint.20
Compared to other states, Alabama’s liability shield law tracks STWA’s
handling of damages even more fully. Alabama significantly limits
recoverable damages even in the tort claims permitted by the shield. A
prevailing plaintiff may only win “economic compensatory damages,” a
category that excludes all damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish,
etc. and all punitive or exemplary damages 21 . In wrongful death actions,
Alabama bans compensatory damages entirely, allowing only punitive
damages.22
STWA itself reiterates doctrines curtailing recovery that many states had
already enacted outside of their COVID-19 liability shield laws. So, STWA
2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.38(3)(c)2c (West 2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-30-32-7 (West
2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.1005 1 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-68-2 (2021). STWA
imposed the “clear and convincing standard.” Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.
17
Dean v. Martz, 329 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1959) (“[Primary assumption of risk] is independent
of negligence, as where a person participates in a sport or amusement with others or
voluntarily goes or remains in a place and freely assents to conduct of another person
which may involve a risk of injury not intended or which is not the result of a negligent or
wrongful act.”); Kleppe v. Prawl, 313 P.2d 227 (Kan. 1957) (“[Primary]
assumption of risk arises through implied contract of assuming the risk of a known danger;
the essence of it is venturousness; it implies intentional exposure to a known danger; it
embraces a mental state of willingness; it pertains to the preliminary conduct of getting into
a dangerous employment or relation; it means voluntarily incurring the risk of an accident,
which may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid; it
defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an
accident occurs.”); Prescott v Ralphs Grocery Co., 265 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1954) (“The defense
of [primary] assumption of risk, on the other hand, will negative liability regardless of the
fact that plaintiff may have acted with due care . . . . It is available when there has been a
voluntary acceptance of a risk and such acceptance, whether express or implied, has been
made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk . . . .”).
18
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-16-3 (West 2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-16-4 (West 2020); MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.1005 3 (West 2021).
19
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.38(3)(a) (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.835(1)(a) (West
2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-802(c)(1) (West 2020). STWA also called for specified
particulars in a plaintiff’s complaint, for example requiring the plaintiff to state “every
other person or place visited by the [plaintiff] in addition to defendant and "every other
person who visited the [plaintiff's] residence” and “factual basis for the belief that these
persons and places were not the cause of the personal injury alleged.” Safe to Work Act, S.
4317.
20
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.38(3)(b) (West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-802(c)(2) (West
2020); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REMEDIES CODE ANN. § 148.003 (b)-(c) (West 2021). STWA also
required a medical affidavit from non-treating physician. Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.
21
ALA. CODE § 6-5-793(b)(2) (2021).
22
Id. § 6-5-792(d) (“A party asserting a health emergency claim alleging wrongful death is
only entitled to an award of punitive damages.”).
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eliminated joint and several liability, capped any “noneconomic damages”
below or at the amount of any compensatory damages, and abolished the
collateral source rule. 23 Furthermore, because it was proposed federal
legislation, STWA had some additional distinctive features: along with an
explicit preemption provision, 24 STWA channeled all allowable tort suits
arising from COVID-19 to federal court, by giving federal courts concurrent
jurisdiction and making it easy for cases brought in state court to be removed
to federal court.25
STWA was not enacted. Nevertheless, the STWA-like state laws
drastically limit personal injury claims against a wide range of potential
defendants. In essence, when it comes to COVID-19, these bills do away with
negligence law, offering no replacement or alternative way to for COVID-19
sufferers to hold accountable those whose careless conduct demonstrably
caused their infections and resulting injuries. The state COVID-19 shields
also modify procedural and evidentiary requirements so that even when a suit
for personal injury is allowed, the plaintiff will have a particularly tough time
winning.
As I observed before, extinguishing negligence liability and severely
constricting all other tort liability might seem a peculiar response to the
emergence of an extremely dangerous virus. It appears considerably odder
upon the realization that even before STWA was introduced and before states
passed COVID-19 liability shields, state law already made it unlikely that
many parties would ever face tort claims for injuries caused by COVID-19.
First, workers compensation systems shield businesses from employee
COVID-19 tort claims. 26 Second, the widespread presence of the SARSCoV-2 virus makes it hard for anybody to prove that a particular place was
the one where they contracted their case of COVID-19. Given the realities of
the contingency fee system, this causation hurdle would likely function as a
de facto liability shield by discouraging plaintiffs’ lawyers from ever taking
cases from most COVID-19 sufferers. The unlikelihood of large numbers of
personal injury claims and the even greater unlikelihood of plaintiffs winning
them was reported as soon as the push for COVID-19 liability shields
emerged.27 There has been no surge of claims in states where shields have
23

Safe to Work Act, S. 4317.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Most of the COVID-19 liability shield laws explicitly preserve workers compensation
claims, though causation requirements under workers compensation law make these
unlikely to be allowed.
27
Greg Rosalsky, Should We Shield Businesses from COVID-19 Lawsuits?, WBUR (July
28, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/npr/895947722/should-we-shield-businesses-from-covid19-lawsuits; Erik Larson, et al., Businesses Fear Lawsuits from Sick Employees, Patrons
After Reopening, INS. J. (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/04/20/565443.htm.
24
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continues.29
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3 Predecessors to COVID-19 liability shields
Very quickly after the initial outbreak of COVID-19, Senate Republicans
were able to introduce an intricately structured set of doctrinal provisions to
quash tort liability arising from COVID-19. It surely helped that STWA’s
drafters were not writing on a blank slate. While some of the doctrines
referenced in the bills, such as primary assumption of risk, predate the
twentieth century, more of the bill resembles doctrinal schemes that began
appearing in the late 1970s. In this section, I provide some developments
from the mid-to-late twentieth century to highlight their continuity with the
COVID-19 liability shields.
3.1 Attempted federal interventions in state products liability law
3.1.1 The Uniform Products Liability Act of 1979
Starting in the 1970s, manufacturers and sellers of consumer goods sought
and got federal involvement in state tort law. In 1976, the Ford administration
convened a “Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability,” later
continued by the Carter administration.30 The task force laid the groundwork
for a proposed Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA), eventually
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1979.31 UPLA justified
federal involvement in state products liability law because of alleged
“uncertainties” 32 it created, a harbinger of the rationale used in STWA.
UPLA proffered a doctrinal scheme that would cut back on tort claims for
28
Chris Marr, Covid-19 Shield Laws Proliferate Even as Liability Suits Do Not,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 8, 2021, 2:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/covid-19-shield-laws-proliferate-even-as-liability-suits-do-not.
29
Chris Marr, States Prolong COVID-19 Liability Shield as Pandemic Persists,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 20, 2021, 10:38 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/states-prolong-covid-19-liability-shields-as-pandemic-persists; see David A. Lieb,
Missouri Passes COVID-19 Liability Shield for Businesses, AP NEWS (Mar. 14, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/michael-brown-coronavirus-pandemic-health-government-andpolitics-ac0fcb2871569ded4ea7bd804c639d34; David A. Lieb, Arizona Governor Signs
COVID-19 Liability Shield, AP NEWS (Apr. 5, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/businessarizona-health-lawsuits-legislation-fddda86f00a0b03b3e5bf6c4971440ce; Chris Marr, West
Virginia Enacts COVID-19 Liability Shield, Gig Workers Law, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 19,
2021, 12:28 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/west-virginia-enactscovid-19-liability-shield-gig-workers-law.
30
Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act — A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 579, 580 (1980).
31
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979).
32
Id. (“The Task Force found that uncertainties in the tort-litigation system were a principal
cause of the product liability problem.”).
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personal injuries caused by product sellers, partly by explicitly limiting
grounds for suit and partly by making claims less valuable and so less likely
to attract lawyers to represent the injured.
Among the UPLA provisions that foreshadowed later, more explicit
liability shields: tying the definition of product defect to manufacturer
blameworthiness (as opposed to limiting the focus to an examination of the
product itself);33 narrowing claims against non-manufacturer product sellers
in a distribution chain; 34 presumptively deeming products not defective if
they comply with administrative or legislative standards; 35 requiring
extensive notice of a claim to possible defendants;36 giving product sellers
and their attorneys the right to recover pecuniary damages from plaintiffs
who do not comply with notice requirements;37 cabining the length of time
for injured parties to bring claims;38 limiting damages for pain and suffering
(so-called noneconomic loss damages) and defining these as losses without
market value (non-pecuniary damages); 39 abrogating the collateral source
rule;40 and increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof for punitive damages to
the clear and convincing standard and designating the judge rather than the
jury to set the amount of such damages.41
In 1980, Victor Schwartz, the chair of the panel that drafted UPLA,
participated in an academic symposium where he discussed the view of tort
law that guided UPLA’s formulation.42 To synopsize:
•
The aim of tort liability is to shift costs of some injuries from the
injured to the injurer, a categorically different undertaking than
supplying resources to address needs arising from injury. Liability for
another person’s injury should turn on a particularistic inquiry into
whether the injurer is blameworthy. Causation alone is never
sufficient basis for requiring the injurer to pay damages to the
injured.43
•
An injurer’s compliance with applicable legislative or administrative
standards cuts against any finding of blameworthiness.44
•
Liability for personal injury should be assessed based on comparative
fault with careful attention to the role of blameworthy causal conduct
33

Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995).
Id. § 105.
35
Id. § 108.
36
Id. § 109.
37
Id. § 109(E).
38
Id. § 110.
39
Id. § 118.
40
Id. § 119.
41
Id. § 120.
42
Schwartz, supra note 30.
43
Id. at 584.
44
Id. at 588-89.
34
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from the injured party.45
State legislatures should rely on uniform or model bills to ensure
uniformity of tort law.46

Despite attempts, Congress never enacted a statute based on UPLA.47 But
Schwartz’s vision of tort law prefigured future efforts to introduce
eliminative tort doctrines to state and federal law. 48
3.1.2 The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995
Fifteen years after UPLA, Congress passed the Product Liability Fairness Act
of 1995 (PLFA). 49 Though eventually vetoed by President Bill Clinton,
PLFA’s provisions would have effectuated eliminative tort doctrines echoing
some of UPLA’s and presaging some of STWA’s. PLFA explicitly
preempted state law;50 limited the grounds of liability for non-manufacturer
product sellers to negligence and breach of express warranty; 51 made a
product user’s intoxication or drug use a complete defense to liability if that
intoxication or drug use was more than 50% responsible for the accident;52
made product misuse or alteration by the consumer a basis for reducing
45

Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 592.
47
Bernard Bell, Fortieth Anniversary: The Commerce Department’s Foray into Re-Writing
Products Liability Law, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/fortieth-anniversary-the-commerce-departments-foray-intore-writing-products-liability-law/.
48
Schwartz himself went on to play an individual role in these efforts. He has been
prominent in the American Legislative Exchange Council, a group very active in
publishing model tort doctrines, as I discuss in section 4. Schwartz went on to ALEC’s
“Board of Scholars,” to co-chair its “Civil Justice Task Force,” and, in 2003, to receive its
“Private Sector Member of the Year Award.” Biography: Victor Schwartz, ALEC Board of
Scholars, https://www.alec.org/person/victor-schwartz/). Additionally, Schwartz is a senior
member of the Shook Hardy & Bacon law firm’s “National Amicus Practice,” which
advertises its intervention in cases “where creative plaintiffs’ lawyers seek to expand tort,
product liability, and consumer law” and on “unsound litigation practices that put American
businesses at risk of excessive, improper liability” and on defending “the prerogative of
state legislatures to enact laws placing rational, needed constraints on liability.” National
Amicus Practice, SHOOK, HARDY, & BACON,
https://www.shb.com/services/practices/public-policy/national-amicus-practice. Schwartz
and his partners frequently prepare and submit amicus briefs in tort litigation on behalf of
the same business groups that lobbied for STWA. See id. (“The breadth and success of
Shook’s National Amicus Practice has made it the choice of prominent business
associations including . . . U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of
Manufacturers . . . .”). For examples, see Brief for Amicus Curiae, In Re New York City
Asbestos Litigation, 216 A.D.2d 79 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995) (No. 4000/1988); Amicus Curiae
Brief, Burningham v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., 448 P.3d 1283 (Utah, 2018) (No.
20180143-SC); Amicus Curiae Brief, Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So.2d 467 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (No. SC08-541).
49
Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995).
50
Id. § 102.
51
Id. § 103.
52
Id. § 104.
46
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damages payable by a product seller; 53 imposed a two year statute of
limitations and largely limited suit to accidents caused in the first fifteen years
of a product’s life;54 required punitive damages to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence;55 capped punitive damages;56 and eliminated joint and
several liability for so-called “noneconomic loss,”57 defined as “subjective,
nonmonetary loss.”58
PLFA elaborated what became familiar justifications for federal
involvement in state tort law. According to the text of the bill, these measures
were necessary because “our Nation [was] overly litigious, the civil justice
system is overcrowded, sluggish, and excessively costly;”59 because damage
awards [were] “excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary;”60 and because
state product liability law [was] inconsistent and contradictory, resulting in
inequitable uncertainty.61 Overall, according to PLFA, there was “a need to
restore rationality, certainty, and fairness . . . to protect against “excessive,
arbitrary and uncertain damage awards.”62
PLFA was vetoed. To date, there is no general, federally mandated
liability shield for all products makers and sellers. But there is such a shield
for one specific group of products makers and sellers.
3.2 The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
In 1995, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(PLCAA),63 adding to tort law an explicit and comprehensive liability shield
barring most personal injury claims against those who make and sell firearms
and ammunition. PLCAA does not mince words. After two sections
specifying findings and purposes, the bill has a stark, short section entitled
“Prohibition on Bringing of Qualified Civil Liability Actions in Federal or
State Court.” 64 The first clause of the section states in its entirety, “A
qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State
court.”65 The second clause requires courts to dismiss any “qualified civil
liability action” pending on the date of PLCAA’s enactment.66 The category
53

Id. § 105.
Id. § 106.
55
Id. § 108.
56
Id.
57
Id. § 110.
58
Id. § 101 (12).
59
Id. § 2(a)(1).
60
Id. § 2(a)(2).
61
Id. § 2(a)(3).
62
Id. § 2(a)(10).
63
15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903.
64
15 U.S.C. § 7902.
65
15 U.S.C. § 7902(a).
66
15 U.S.C. § 7902(b).
54
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of qualified civil liability action is broad: it includes almost all civil actions
and administrative proceeding seeking any kind of relief or penalty from any
firearms or ammunition manufacturer or seller, including manufacturers and
sellers of component parts, if the relief sought results from criminal or
unlawful misuse of the firearms, ammunition, or components thereof. 67
PLCAA creates six narrow exceptions to this broad grant of immunity from
tort liability.68 Though the precise reach of these exceptions is contested,69
they fall roughly into two groups. One set allows actions against
manufacturers and sellers who violate certain laws aimed at preventing
criminals and other legally disallowed users from obtaining guns. The other
set permits gun users and bystanders to bring products liability claims for
defective guns and ammunition so long as the gun was being used as intended
or in a reasonably foreseeable manner and so long as the injury did not stem
from a criminal discharging the weapon or using the ammunition.
Notwithstanding these exceptions, PLCAA bars almost all civil claims
against firearms and ammunition makers and sellers. This broad elimination
of civil liability resembles the approach to COVID-19 taken in STWA and
its state law counterparts.
3.3 Eliminative tort doctrines in state law
Many states began adopting eliminative tort doctrines in the 1980s. 70
Following David Logan, we can regard eliminative tort doctrines in state law
as “changes to procedure, changes to substantive law, and limits on available
remedies.”71 These changes have yielded widespread limits on class actions
for personal injury; requirements for medical malpractice actions ranging
from binding arbitration to mandating that plaintiffs file with their judicial
complaint a medical expert affidavit supporting the claim; broad statutes of
repose which time bar claims based on a fix period independent of when a
plaintiff discovers injury or defendant misconduct; and abolition of the
collateral source rule. 72
Other common eliminative doctrines in state law include:73 termination
67

15 U.S.C. § 7903(4)(1)(A).
15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi).
69
Plaintiffs have argued, with some success, that public nuisance and consumer protection
laws are sometimes applicable to the sale and marketing of firearms and ammunition, such
that their violation subjects a maker or seller to personal injury claims per 15 U.S.C. §
7903(5)(A)(iii).
70
Nadia Dahab, Oregon’s History on Caps: The Outlook After Horton, 96 OR. L. REV. 621,
625 (2018).
71
See David A. Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CINN. L. REV.
903, 907 (2015).
72
Id. at 907-14.
73
This list is based on West Virginia’s law, because West Virginia developed its eliminative
tort doctrines later than other states did, aligning West Virginia law with what already
68
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of joint and several liability; restrictions on grounds of liability for
nonmanufacturer sellers; elimination of landowner or land occupier liability
for “open and obvious” dangers and for injuries to trespassers; no liability if
an injury victim’s own “illegal or immoral” conduct proximately caused the
accident from which the claim arises; requirement that plaintiff establish
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence of defendant’s actual
malice toward plaintiff or conscious, reckless indifference to the health,
safety, and welfare of others; caps on punitive damages; and restrictions on
medical malpractice liability including caps on noneconomic damages. In
various ways these doctrines resemble doctrines featured in STWA, UPLA,
PFLA, and PLCAA. To some degree, this is because eliminative doctrines of
all sorts have been promulgated and supported by the same group of nongovernmental organizations.
4 Organizational drafters of eliminative tort doctrines
Eliminative tort doctrines have consistently been promulgated or supported
by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (CoC), and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).
Their efforts merit attention for understanding the origins of the content and
structure of state and federal COVID-19 liability shields and of state and
federal eliminative products liability doctrines, including both those meant to
cover all products sellers and those directed at specific industry.74
obtained elsewhere. See Cary Silverman & Richard Heath, Mountain State Transformation:
West Virginia’s Move into the Mainstream, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 27 (2018).
74
NAM and CoC have both lobbied in favor of PLCAA, and ALEC has touted PLCAA as
a model for product liability more generally. See Bill Profile: S. 397, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/bills/summary?id=s397-109 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2021); and Bill Profile: H.R. 800, OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/bills/summary?id=hr800-109 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2021) (showing NAM’s self-reports registering its lobbying related to PLCAA).
See Alden Crow, Comment, Shooting Blanks: The Ineffectiveness of the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 59 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1821 n.73 (2006) (“America’s
business community weighed in strongly in favor for [PLCAA], with letters of support
coming from the National Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
National Federation of Independent Businesses.”); U.S. Chamber of Commerce Supports S.
659, INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Aug. 4, 2003), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20030804/uschamber-of-commerce-supports-s-6 (quoting a letter from CoC executive vice-president for
government affairs stating that “[t]he U.S. Chamber is greatly concerned about the growing
trend of litigation being filed against entire legal industries with the goal of either raising
government revenue or achieving policy goals outside the constraints of the political
process. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act would help curtail this abusive
situation”). When testifying to Congress in favor of PLCAA, lobbyists for the gun industry
and gun users specifically cited NAM and CoC support for the bill. Lawrence G. Keane,
Testimony during House Hearing at 109th Congress (Mar. 15, 2005) (transcript available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg20015/html/CHRG109hhrg20015.htm). See also Amy Kjose Anderson, Should State Legislators Embrace
Bernie Sanders’ Policy, ALEC (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.alec.org/article/should-state-
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In April 2020, NAM urged Congress to “prevent[] the creative use of state
[personal injury law] claims” 75 in a press release entitled “Manufacturers
Fight COVID-19 But Face Legal Obstacles.”76 NaM exhorted Congress to
create “Pandemic Liability Policy Protections.” 77 Eventually, when
Republican Senators introduced STWA, NAM’s general counsel announced,
“The SAFE TO WORK Act mirrors the liability recommendations proposed
by manufacturers as part of our ‘American Renewal Action Plan’ in April
(emphasis added).”78
Also in the spring of 2020, both CoC and its Institute for Legal Reform
(ILR) began pressing for federal action to curtail COVID-19 related tort
claims. In April, ILR held a virtual event called “COVID-19 Federal Liability
Issues and Solutions.” 79 Subsequently, CoC wrote to Congress, listing a
panoply of possible COVID-19 related legal claims it wanted Congress to
extinguish. The letter dedicated an entire section to “Exposure Liability.”80
There, CoC pushed for a Congressionally enacted “safe harbor” from
negligence suits against companies so long as they were following “CDC or
state/local guidelines” and they had not committed “gross negligence,
recklessness, or willful misconduct.”81 CoC also advocated “channeling . . .
claims into federal court,” a device eventually incorporated into STWA. In
July, CoC included specifics of their proposal for shielding companies from
COVID-19 personal injury claims in a sweeping set of asks addressed to
President Donald Trump, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and Senate
Majority Leader McConnell.82
While NAM and CoC concentrated on the federal government, ALEC
published a model state bill that, without mentioning COVID-19 explicitly,
legislators-embrace-bernie-sanders-policy/ (characterizing PLCAA as “a commonsense
lawsuit reform protecting gun manufacturers from scheming theories of liability” and
urging that the same immunity from suit in PLCAA should be extended to all products
manufacturers).
75
NAM Newsroom, Manufacturers Fight COVID-19 but Face Legal Obstacles, NAT’L
ASS’N OF MFRS. (Apr. 22, 2020, 9:06 AM), https://www.nam.org/manufacturers-fightcovid-19-but-face-legal-obstacles-8088/?stream=policy-legal.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Manufacturers on SAFE TO WORK Act, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS. (July 28, 2020, 4:51
PM), https://www.nam.org/manufacturers-on-safe-to-work-act-9995/?stream=series-pressreleases.
79
ILR Briefly Live Event: COVID-19 Federal Liability Issues and Solutions, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, https://instituteforlegalreform.com/event/ilr-brieflylive-event-covid-19-federal-liability-issues-and-solutions/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
80
Memorandum from Suzanne Clark, President of U.S. Chamber of Commerce to
Members of U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Implementing a National Return to Work
Plan, (Apr. 13, 2020), (on file with U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
81
Id.
82
Letter from Thomas J. Donahue, CEO of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Donald Trump,
President, Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, and Nancy Pelosi, House Speaker
(July 16, 2020) (on file with U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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would nevertheless severely limit COVID-19 related personal injury claims.
If enacted, state laws based on the “Liability Protection for Employers in a
Declared Disaster or Public Emergency Act” (Liability Protection Model
Act) would:83
•
eliminate most tort claims against every possible defendant. Covered
defendants included “any natural person, partnership, corporation,
limited liability company, company, trust, estate, for-profit or
nonprofit association, or any other business entity” and “the state, a
political subdivision, emergency management agency, or other
agency of the state including but not limited to universities.”84
•
make compliance with federal agency regulations, state and local
statutes and regulations, and gubernatorial and presidential executive
orders a bar to all civil liability.85
•
in the absence of regulations, statutes, or executive orders, restrict
civil liability to reckless or willful misconduct.86
•
prohibit courts from recognizing implied private rights of action from
statutes, regulations, executive orders, or guidance issued in response
to a disaster or emergency.87
The Liability Protection Model Act generalizes the details and architecture
of STWA, expanding them to cover all official emergencies and disasters. It
also draws on ALEC’s work on eliminative tort doctrines in other contexts,
especially in products liability law.
In 1995, ALEC published its Model Products Liability Act (MPLA).
MPLA defines and categorizes product defects as UPLA did,88 tying them to
manufacturer blameworthiness. Again, like UPLA, it limits products liability
claims against product sellers other than manufacturers.89 But the more major
resemblances between UPLA and MPLA are found in further ALEC model
bills that MPLA incorporates by reference. Because the incorporated model
bills are not specific to personal injuries caused by products, the latest version
of MPLA includes much of ALEC’s blueprint for the entire law of personal
injury, not just products liability.
The Regulatory Compliance Congruity With Liability Act provides three
83
Liability Protection for Employers in a Declared Disaster or Public Emergency Act,
ALEC, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/liability-protection-for-employers-in-a-declareddisaster-or-public-emergency-act/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
84
Id. (quoting from § 1(2)).
85
Id. (quoting from § 2(1)).
86
Id. (quoting from § 2(3)).
87
Id. (quoting from § 2(4)).
88
Product Liability Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 1, 2012), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/product-liability-act/, (defining defect in terms of what makes a product
“unreasonably dangerous,” breaking out defects into manufacturing, design, and failure to
warn; including deviation from express warranty as possible unreasonably dangerous
defect in § 4).
89
Id. (providing rules of liability for product sellers in §8).
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options for making compliance with administrative and legislative standards,
order, and approvals suffice to defeat personal injury claims.90 The Ten Year
Statute of Repose Act limits the time period in which a personal injury claim
can be brought against a product seller or a service provider. 91 The
Assumption of Risk Act reestablishes primary of assumption of risk as a
complete defense to a tort claim.92 The Transparency in Lawsuits Protection
Act prevents courts from recognizing implied private causes of action arising
from legislation.93
Apart from what the MPLA incorporates by reference, ALEC has
published numerous other bills fleshing out its vision for tort law. The
Comparative Fault Act bars recovery if a fact-finder concludes the plaintiff’s
fault exceeds that of injurers, including those not before the court. 94 The
Punitive Damages Standards Act is extremely detailed. Among other
measures, it requires punitive damages only on a showing of “actual malice,”
a level of culpability to be proved by “clear and convincing evidence”;
disallows plaintiff from pleading a specific amount in punitive damages;
excludes evidence of the defendant’s financial condition or net worth; and
sets a ceiling on punitive damages.95 The Noneconomic Damages Awards
Act caps damages for pain and suffering and other categories of loss which
the act deems “subjective” and “nonpecuniary.”96 The Truth in Damages Act
abrogates the collateral source rule.97 The Fair Share Act eliminates joint and
several liability in all tort cases except for when the plaintiff can prove
conscious and deliberate concert of action to commit an intentional tort.98
The Rational Use of a Product Act permits product liability only if the injury
arises from reasonable and foreseeable misuse of a product rather than simply
90
Regulatory Compliance Congruity with Liability Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/regulatory-compliance-congruity-with-liability-act/
(providing three options under the model act when a service provider or manufacturer
complies with the law: no liability, rebuttable presumption of no liability, or no punitive
damages).
91
Ten-Year Statute of Repose Act, ALEC (amended June 23, 2017),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/ten-year-statute-of-repose-act/.
92
Assumption of Risk Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/assumption-of-risk-act/ (stating that defendant is not liable if an injured person knew
of and appreciated the risk posed by the defendant and voluntarily exposed herself to
resulting danger that caused her injury or damage).
93
Transparency in Lawsuits Protection Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013)
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/transparency-in-lawsuits-protection-act/.
94
Comparative Fault Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/comparative-fault-act/.
95
Punitive Damages Standards Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/punitive-damages-standards-act/.
96
Noneconomic Damage Awards Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/noneconomic-damage-awards-act/.
97
Truth in Damages Act, ALEC (amended Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/truth-in-damages-act/.
98
Fair Share Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/fairshare-act/.

16

From Liability Shields to Democratic Theory

a foreseeable misuse. Even when a plaintiff reasonably uses a product in an
unintended way, this constitutes misuse for purposes of considering the
plaintiff’s comparative fault and leads to a reduction in damages to the extent
the plaintiff’s use of the product caused the injury.99 The Actual Harms Act
restricts damage claims to those that produce documented economic loss.100
The Anchors Away Act prohibits plaintiffs from specifying to juries any
particular amount of damages, or range of amounts, for pain and suffering
and other nonpecuniary losses.101
ALEC disseminates its model tort doctrine widely, and research indicates
that ALEC model bills regularly influence state legislatures. 102
Unsurprisingly, then, all the aforementioned ALEC model bills have
counterparts in many states’ COVID-19 liability shields as well as in their
more general tort doctrine.
5 The theory of tort deflationism
For almost fifty years, eliminative doctrines have been proliferating in both
federal and state law. We need to consider how tort theory can make sense of
them, their interrelationship with each other, and their connection to the
larger body of law governing personal injury. In this section, I formulate an
initial version of a tort theory sensitive to this project, a theory I call “tort
deflationism.” I begin by extrapolating from the doctrines reviewed in prior
sections a set of mid-level principles. Such principles sit between doctrine
and a full-blown theory.
5.1 Mid-level principles
Drawing from the eliminative tort doctrines surveyed in section 3, we can
develop some mid-level principles that lend coherence to them:
•
•

Except under limited, delineated conditions, the state should not hold
injurers legally liable to those they injure.
When injurer-to-injured legal accountability is permitted or required,

99
Rational Use of A Product Act, ALEC (amended Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/rational-use-of-a-product-act/.
100
Actual Harms Act, ALEC (May 6, 2016), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/actualharms-act/.
101
Amendments to Anchors Away Act, ALEC (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.alec.org/modelpolicy/anchors-away-act/.
102
Molly Jackman, ALEC’s Influence over Lawmaking in State Legislatures, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-instate-legislatures/ (“ALEC model bills are, word-for-word, introduced in . . . state
legislatures at a non-trivial rate. [T]hey have a good chance – better than most legislation –
of being enacted into law.”).
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there should be limits on the amounts and kinds of damages available
to the injured.
Exceptions to the presumption against injurer-to-injured legal
accountability should be based on the culpability of the injurer;
generally, a showing of negligence does not suffice and proving a
more knowing, even malicious, state of mind is necessary.
The extent or severity of harm an activity risks does not ground
exceptions to the presumption against injurer-to-injured
accountability.
Tort liability should serve the interests of producers, sellers, and
service providers and by so doing serve the interests of the entire
community.
Legislatively enacted tort law is often superior to judicially created
tort law.
Uniform tort law across the states is desirable.
Injurers are not accountable to injury victims who knowingly and
voluntarily assume risk of injury.
When a criminal causes injury no other party is legally accountable to
the injury victim.
The only losses from personal injury that the law can reliably
ascertain are those that can be quantified in terms of market value.
When tort claims are allowed, they should be tightly circumscribed:
threshold issues of fact should be decided by judges; to establish
liability plaintiffs should have to meet standards of proof higher than
the preponderance of the evidence; to survive dismissal, complaints
should be highly particular and be accompanied by verification of the
validity of the allegations by an expert witness.

A full-blown tort theory concerned with eliminative doctrines should
organize and interrelate these mid-level principles with reference to more
general intellectual and ethical commitments. In extant academic tort
theories, such commitments have, to date, come from a range of sources
including Kantian moral philosophy, virtue ethics, neo-classical economics,
feminist theory, critical race theory, classical Lockean political theory, liberal
egalitarianism, American legal realism, and philosophical pragmatism. Tort
deflationism, by contrast, draws on a body of broad intellectual and ethical
commitments, coming from another, and very different, source.
5.2 Modern American conservatism
The mid-twentieth century emergence of eliminative tort doctrine coincides
with the advent of a larger intellectual, social, and political movement:
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modern American conservatism. There is an extensive literature about this
movement, with contributions from proponents, critics, journalists, and
scholars. 103 For present purposes, I supply the following précis of its
definitive ideas and themes, giving prominence to those particularly pertinent
to tort deflationism.
Modern American conservatism fuses ideas from libertarianism,
Chicago-School free-market economics, and Christian evangelicalism. This
synthesis approves only a small range for government action. Government
may act to maintain order, stability, and certain kinds of hierarchy, but only
if it does not encroach upon the prerogatives of appropriate churches (white
evangelical Christian ones and those with sufficiently comparable tenets and
practices), acceptable families (heterosexual, two-parent, patriarchal), and
the market (capitalist). In part, this restrictive view about the acceptable scope
for government action rests on beliefs about the inherent authority of these
other institutions and the clash between their proper jurisdiction and state
power. The view also rests on a belief about the incompetence of government.
Government is too removed, too big, too clumsy for tasks other than keeping
the peace. When government does properly maintain order and stability,
individuals and nongovernmental organizations can attend to all the other
tasks government might attempt but is likely to botch. In short, it is not only
that the demands of liberty that require limited government action; so too do
the demands of well-being. For the most part, individuals and nongovernmental institutions left to their own devices enjoy freedom from
illegitimate government supervision and ultimately do a better job of
improving social welfare.
5.3 From mid-level principles to more full-blown tort theory
With this admittedly abbreviated synopsis of modern American conservatism
in mind, we can start to order and synthesize the mid-level principles. The
most foundational principle for full-blown tort deflationism is the
presumption against legal accountability from an injurer to those caused
injury (injurer-to-injured legal accountability). This presumption broadly
103
My own precis of modern American conservatism draws from many sources including:
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR., GOD AND MAN AT YALE: THE SUPERSTITIONS OF “ACADEMIC
FREEDOM” (Regnery Gateway 2021) (1951); FRANCES FITZGERALD, THE EVANGELICALS:
THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICA (2017); BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A
CONSERVATIVE (1st ed.1960); RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO
ELIOT (Regnery Gateway 2016) (1953); GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE
INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (Intercollegiate Studies Institute 2014)
(1976); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A
WOMAN’S CRUSADE (2008); PETER STEINFELS, THE NEOCONSERVATIVES: THE ORIGINS OF
A MOVEMENT (2013); BENJAMIN C. WATERHOUSE, LOBBYING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF
BUSINESS FROM NIXON TO NAFTA (2014).
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safeguards against overreaching governmental efforts to address injurious
activity and its consequences. While some governmental efforts in this area
are warranted, neither the simple fact of injury or suffering nor their
seriousness suggests that government can legitimately or competently do
anything about either injury or suffering. Hence, the basic presumption
against injurer-to-injured legal accountability.
Where government action may be needed is to handle injury-causing
activity that threatens order, stability, and appropriate hierarchy. In this
situation, injurer-to-injured legal accountability may be warranted. When
people set out to injure others or flagrantly ignore the risks of doing so, their
conduct poses a palpable threat to order. Thus, it makes prima facie sense to
make exceptions to the presumption against injurer-to-injured legal
accountability in cases of intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct
that causes others injury. But caution against government overreach and
ineptitude counsels against making this accountability too easily sought or
won. Keeping damage awards low, allowing damages only in some
categories, and refusing damages for any losses that cannot be priced via the
market makes it less attractive for individuals to trigger government action in
the form of a lawsuit resulting in a legally enforceable judgement against a
defendant. So too does giving injurers repeated opportunities to avoid legal
accountability and to reduce its costs. Hence, the use of procedure to limit
claims and recovery.
Though tort deflationism thus anticipates some injurer-to-injured legal
accountability, it also expects that it should be as cabined as possible,
including by legislative codification. Statutory authorizations of personal
injury claims can be written narrowly, thereby discouraging judicial
expansion of legal accountability. Additionally, legislative codification can
impose or foster uniformity in legal accountability across jurisdictions, which
in turn improves conditions for a national market, expanding opportunity for
providers of goods and services.
Whether legislative or judicial, government action should be a last resort.
For example, it is better to rely on the market itself to minimize personal
injury caused by producers, sellers, and service providers. Market
competition can foster safety and even post-injury compensation.
Government action to ensure competition may be necessary, but after that the
market itself will curb excessively unsafe practices from producers, sellers,
and service providers and, if enough consumers prefer it, will inspire them to
offer post-injury recompense. To the extent the market does not adequately
weed out reckless or willful conduct from these producers, sellers, and
providers, culpability-based exceptions to the general presumption against
injurer-to-injured legal accountability come into play.
The choice of whether to encounter risk of personal injury should remain
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with the individual. For the most part, individuals can protect themselves
from risk by choosing to refrain from activities that subject them to it.
Furthermore, when a person knowingly and voluntarily subjects herself to the
risk of a particular kind of injury, her choice overrides the legal significance
of almost anybody else’s causal role in bringing about that injury. The only
exception is criminal conduct that causes injury. Criminal conduct overrides
the significance of any non-criminal’s actions, including the injury victim’s.
This is because criminal action that inflicts personal injury seriously threatens
order, licensing legal consequences for the criminal. These consequences can
include legal accountability from the criminal to one he has personally
injured.
To summarize: tort deflationism integrates commitments from modern
American conservatism with the mid-level principles that span eliminative
tort doctrines. This theoretical synthesis situates the presumption against
injurer-to-injured legal liability in the context of overall limitations on
government action, while also delineating the relatively confined
circumstances under which the presumption can be overcome, and more
permissive tort doctrines allowed.
5.4 The reach of tort deflationism: the law of workplace injury
A tort theory should have reach. This means it should be able to illuminate
large areas of law, including those that seemingly run counter to the theory.
While I developed tort deflationism to account for the post-1960s wave of
eliminative tort doctrines, it can illuminate other developments in the law of
personal injury. To demonstrate, I consider the law of workplace injury,
which, early in the twentieth century, saw a turn toward more permissive tort
doctrines, and then, in the first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of
workers compensation programs as the exclusive venue for settling legal
accountability for workplace injuries. Tort deflationism, I argue, makes sense
of both developments.
Too many workers injured too badly unsettles business operations and
strains the ability of non-state institutions to provide for injured workers and
their dependents. If the workplace becomes too perilous, labor may exit or
organize to demand safer conditions, interfering with production and
challenging owners’ and managers’ authority over the work environment.
When conditions like these arise, tort deflationism can, without contradiction
or incoherence, explain the demise of eliminative tort doctrines. It can
account for judicial reworking of doctrines that had completely barred
employers’ tort liability throughout the nineteenth century, functioning as a
liability shield. When the high incidence of workplace injury created
disorder, instability, and resistance to traditional hierarchy, the law shifted
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just as tort deflationism would expect it to.
Just as tort doctrine governing workplace injury started to become more
permissive, state governments began to replace tort liability altogether with
workers compensation schemes. Compared to litigation, these made it easy
for injured workers to file claims and gain monetary relief. 104 One might
think this would pose a puzzle for tort deflationism, though as it actually turns
out, tort deflationism is quite useful for understanding the advent of workers
compensation programs with the features generally adopted in the United
States.
When the demands of order necessitate some kind of employer-to-worker
legal accountability, tort deflationism can account for a switch from
adjudication to administrative programs as long as the latter minimize cost
and burden to employers compared to the former. In an administrative
system, payments can be kept low. They need not make the injured whole so
long as they are sufficient to head off unrest, prevent workers exiting the labor
market, and discouraging collective action by labor.105 By using schedules
rather than personalized damage awards, an administrate program makes
employer costs more amenable to actuarial prediction, lowering the costs of
liability insurance and further minimizing burdens on employers. To ensure
that an administrative system does not lead to further employer-to-injuredemployee legal accountability, the system should be legislatively codified
and administratively conducted without opportunity for judicial expansion.
Today’s workers’ compensation systems have all these features. They are
legislatively codified, agency administered, exclusive channels for employerto-employee legal accountability.106 They replace tort liability with a more
104
This is the so-called Grand Bargain struck by workers compensation systems. See PRICE
V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE
ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 120-147 (2000) (surveying the trend toward
eliminating tort suits as an alternative to workers compensation); NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RSCH., THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 265
(Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994) (explaining that NAM and state business
organizations saw workers comp as a way to “stem the tide of more frequent and larger
jury awards to injured workers,” as state legislatures began to take away the common law
defenses from employers); Robert Asher, The 1911 Wisconsin Workmen’s Compensation
Law: A Study in Conservative Labor Reform, 57 THE WIS. MAG. OF HIST., no.2, Winter
1973-1974, at 123-40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4634868 (discussing that employers
were open to workers compensation insurance programs if the worker chose between the
workers compensation scheme or being sued in tort; employers accepted workers
compensation schemes because of a tendency in the courts towards more liberal verdicts to
injured laborers circa 1905; employers feared that courts would eventually take away the
typical employer common-law defenses).
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restricted and predictable form of liability, one that excludes so-called
noneconomic damages and schedules so-called economic ones. This is
precisely the sort of administrative substitution for tort law tort deflationism
can account for.
6 Tort deflationism and other tort theories
Having laid out a preliminary version of tort deflationism, I now consider
ways it contrasts with some other tort theories. These are not the only
contrasts that could be drawn, and I do not even attempt to discuss all the tort
theories from which tort deflationism differs. The comparisons made here
show how considering tort deflationism can throw other theories into relief.
This can reveal insufficiently defended assumptions in other theories. It can
also show how theories that look dissimilar in some ways look more alike
when considered from the vantage point of tort deflationism. It can prompt
broader questions about what makes one tort theory superior to another.
Despite differences among extant tort theories, many of them depend on
moral ideals explicitly meant to apply universally. 107 The relevant moral
ideals may be deontological or consequentialist, concerned with human
dignity or human welfare, but regardless, it is the very universality of the
ideal that gives it force in accounting for how any given country’s tort law is
and how it should be. The ideals that inform tort deflationism are different:
more contextualized because anchored explicitly to the American situation.
Modern American conservatism does not attempt a universal moral theory.
Its prescriptions depend on contingent features of American history and
culture, such as secular government, certain kinds of churches, an established
capitalist market, and so forth. Modern American conservatism considers
what is right and good for this kind of place, one with these features. Tort
deflationism inherits this contextual sensibility: it is a theory of American tort
law, not of tort law across nation-states. In fact, tort deflationism may have
an advantage over more universalizing tort theories. Its explanatory and
interpretive power might only extend to American tort law, but its sensitivity
to the American context may allow it to make better sense of prominent
these issues. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’
Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J. OF L. & ECON. 305 (1998). The
exclusivity feature was key to employer acceptance of workers compensation. FISHBACK &
KANTOR, supra note 104, at 99-100, 105-07.
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(asserting a universal talionic normative basis for tort law).

From Liability Shields to Democratic Theory

23

features of American tort law than more universalized theories can. If this is
so, why should we abandon tort deflationism for more universalized tort
theories? Even if we reject tort deflationism, it should push us to face and
answer questions of whether and how much universalism in tort theory
matters.
Tort deflationism can also problematize theories more explicitly rooted
in ideals arguably embedded in American culture and history. For example,
some critical tort theories start from ideals of equality that arguably have or
should have force and meaning within the American context. Then, by
showing where tort law disguises or perpetuates certain kinds of inequality,
critical tort theory supplies a basis to change tort doctrine. Feminist tort
theory, for example, sometimes proceeds by demonstrating that seemingly
neutral tort doctrines both rest on and contribute to the ongoing subordination
of women. 108 But the defender of existing doctrines might rely on tort
deflationism to take the sting from this critique. First, the defender might
argue, it is not true that American ideals of equality extend to gender. Second,
even if they do, it is not the place of law, including tort law, to realize ideals
of gender equality. The government is neither inherently empowered nor
competent to implement ideals like equality between men and women.
Gender-hierarchy is not a relevant reason to change tort law.
This sketch of debate between feminist tort theory and tort deflationism
illustrates the capacity of tort deflationism to explain and even to justify tort
law’s role in perpetuating arrangements that critical theorists present as
antithetical to distinctly American ideals. Tort deflationism may provide a
basis for disagreeing about the content of the asserted ideals. More damaging
to the critical theoretical enterprise, however, tort deflationism can account
for the irrelevance of the critical ideal to tort doctrine, without ever contesting
the nature of the ideal itself. The tort deflationist can applaud the ideal, but
still maintain that it does not justify a larger role for injurer-to-injured legal
accountability. Even if we reject tort deflationism, considering it highlights a
general question for the enterprise of tort theory: does it matter, and how
much does it matter, if a tort theory puts tort law beyond the reach of critical
perspectives rooted in the American perspective?
So far, I have juxtaposed tort deflationism with tort theories that assign
substantive moral ambitions–-whether universal or more culturally
embedded—to tort law. Now, I examine how tort deflationism can challenge
theories that purport to make sense of tort law without imparting to it any
particular moral ends. Theories like this makes sense of tort law with
108
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reference to how it generates, through iterated processes of trial and appeal,
principles of interpersonal obligation and ascertains how to apply these in
contested cases.109 Theories like this present tort law as primarily procedural.
Consider civil recourse theory, which rejects the idea of any substantive
moral end as having a necessary place in tort law.110 Civil recourse theory
conceives of tort law as a “system of relational directives, rights and duties,
and powers and liabilities,”111 arrived at by the processes of common law
adjudication. The content of these directives, rights, duties, powers, and
liabilities is not preordained by anything, including the government. The
system is “not fundamentally about a state or a sovereign commanding people
to behave the way it wants them behave so that it can achieve its purposes.”112
It is merely “a formalized version of informal, everyday practices of people
holding themselves and each other accountable.”113
Civil recourse theory presents tort law as merely an apparatus for giving
people the chance to develop obligations and the rest, with their content to be
generated through the operation of the apparatus. That government hosts the
apparatus does not mean the government is dictating the substantive content
of what gets generated.
For now, grant this distinction between process and substance. Tort
deflationism will still object to tort law as construed by civil recourse theory.
Tort deflationism’s reservations about government overreach apply as much
to a government-sponsored system for yielding obligations as they do to more
direct government decrees outlining what we are obligated to do for each
other. Even if tort law is ex ante neutral as to the content of such obligations,
there is no guarantee that the output of the processes of tort law will restrict
injurer-to-injured accountability to what is necessary to maintaining order.
An open-ended process for the development of legally enforceable
interpersonal obligations might end up dictating obligations that go well
beyond this purpose, obligations that intrude upon the prerogatives of
individuals and nongovernmental organizations to determine what we owe
each other when.
Putting tort deflationism alongside civil recourse theory showcases a
problem for all procedural tort theories: how can these theories defend
109
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outputs that clash with moral or critical commitments others refuse to
relinquish?
Some have grappled with the intractability of disagreement about the
proper ends for tort law not by emphasizing its procedural aspect but by
suggesting a more compartmentalized approach to tort law’s subject matter.
According to pluralists, tort theories animated by different goals and concerns
might be suitable for categorically different circumstances of personal
injury. 114 The pluralist observes that variety in tort doctrine arises from
systematic dissimilarities in the type of parties to a tort claim, the complexity
of evidence, and differences in the nature and extent of typical losses. Such
variety militates against single-purpose or single-principle tort theories being
able to make sense of all the doctrines of American tort law. Better to pursue
a more disjunctive approach, taking seriously the possibility that we will end
up with a subdivided law of torts, with different divisions made sense of in
different ways. Whether or not this pluralist strategy can efface the conflicts
between other theories of tort law, it will not be able to accommodate tort
deflationism. Tort deflationism presumptively disallows injured-to-injurer
legal accountability in all settings. Variation in applicable tort law turns on
and can be explained by variation in what is necessary for maintaining order,
not on a group of diverse, further goals. Thus, tort deflationism highlights a
limit on pluralist reconciliations of tort theory: the appearance of different
doctrines for different classes of injury need not signal different ends for
different parts of tort law.
In this section, I have concentrated on some of the ways tort deflationism
challenges the content, argumentative strategy, and methodological tenets of
other tort theories and raises issues of how to show one tort theory’s
superiority to another. In the final section of this article, I argue that
consideration of tort deflationism alongside other tort theories should
motivate a reexamination of the questions with which tort theories of all kinds
should concern themselves.
7 Conclusion
When it comes to theorizing about tort law, there is something of a feedback
mechanism from theory to practice. Judges, legislators, lawyers, and
commentators embed theory in the substantive law itself by referencing it in
opinions, legislative materials, briefs, and treatises. Lawyers appeal to tort
theory to support their side in controversial matters; judges and legislators
use tort theory to settle debates one way or the other. Tort deflationism gives
practitioners, lawmakers, and commentators a resource from which to
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establish eliminative tort doctrines other theories reject and to dispense with
permissive tort doctrines other theories support. Not only can it keep
argument over these doctrines alive, but if it is incorporated, explicitly or
implicitly, into practical legal materials themselves, tort deflationism
becomes part of the law, propelling future doctrinal development in accord
with its tenets. At the same time, tort deflationism is unlikely to convince
everyone. We can expect other theories to continue to feed back into practice
too. With rival theories fueling competing doctrines, we can see that tort
theorizing is unlikely to settle disagreements. By deepening the grounds for
clashing viewpoints, tort theorizing very probably renders disputes over
substantive tort law all the more intractable. The prospect of such systematic,
thoroughgoing, entrenched disagreement raises a theoretical issue not usually
associated with the overall enterprise of tort theory: the legitimacy of law in
twenty-first century pluralist democracy. I want to close this article by
suggesting that tort theory should regard this problem as more central to
understanding tort law and thus to tort theory itself.
The twenty-first century has seen a division in democratic theory over the
significance of disagreement among members of pluralistic democratic
nation-states. On one side are theorists who base the legitimacy of law in such
states on demonstrating some sort of reasoned consensus, available through
processes of dialogic persuasion. 115 There are variations concerning the
specifics of the requisite consensus: it might be hypothetical, realized only
under idealized conditions, and extend to basic principles that govern or
regulate how laws are made, rather than to the particulars of the laws
themselves. But for all in this camp, law’s legitimacy depends essentially on
the reasoned consensus of the governed. Another school of democratic theory
regards deep, even tragic, disagreement over law and politics as the defining
feature of a truly pluralist democracies: in these polities, we cannot arrive at
reasoned consensus, no matter how much idealization is allowed and no
matter how basic the consensus is permitted to be. 116 Virtually every
significant legal arrangement is arrived at or maintained by exerting power
over members of the polity who are not, and will not be persuaded to be, party
to any sort of meaningful consensus about the arrangement itself. For those
in this school, the problem of legitimacy cannot be solved through
deliberative consensus; it must be solved, if it can be, by reconciling
hegemony with democracy. What is needed is an account of how power can
legitimately be exercised to determine legal arrangements.
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At this juncture, I am not concerned with which school of democratic
theory is ultimately correct. Rather, I canvass the debate within democratic
theory to alert tort theorists. I have used tort deflationism to show that we
should anticipate ongoing, pervasive disagreements over which tort doctrines
are permissible, desirable, or forbidden. Moreover, the feedback between tort
theory and tort practice makes these disagreements more abiding, not less. I
believe that tort theory should recognize how contested tort law is.
What is the significance of ineradicable and serious fights over the
substantive tort doctrines to have? Do these struggles undo the legitimacy of
tort law in our pluralist democracy? Does it matter if settled doctrine rests on
hegemony rather than consensus? Can tort law show how some forms of
hegemony are either conducive to or at least not destructive of law’s
legitimacy? Or does tort law illustrate the necessity of ridding law of the
influence of power or at least of certain kinds of power? If tort theory seeks
to make sense of tort law, it must grapple with questions like these.
Acknowledgments: First and foremost, I thank Ariana Lazzaroni and Eric
Dolce for their dedicated and excellent research assistance. This article could
not have been completed without their fine work. For extensive and useful
conversation about the piece, I thank Eileen John. I thank Robin West for her
careful, thoughtful feedback on an earlier version. Throughout this article I
cite other tort scholars’ work as appropriate. But because the article addresses
tort theory generally, many scholars’ writings inform the discussion. I will
inevitably fail to name all those I should, but in addition to the authors cited
in this article, I want to express my appreciation to the following for their
published work related to tort theory, works that have aided my own effort
here: Ken Abraham, Anita Bernstein, Greg Keating, Virginia Nolan, Michael
Rustad, Emily Sherwin, Edmund Ursin, and G. Edward White.

